The objective of our approach is to develop a model that captures horizontal product differentiation under environmental awareness with price competition whereby environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce. As an example, we refer to automobile producers offering cars with a gasoline-powered engine and one with a natural gas-powered engine. The network of petrol stations provides the complementary good. We use a two-stage game in prices and characteristics to analyse the market structure. In order to find out whether a private decision on the type of engine coincides with a socially optimal product differentiation, we determine the position of the two types of engine by a welfaremaximizing authority.
INTRODUCTION
There are many goods for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good depends upon the number of other agents buying the good. Industries that are characterized by the existence of those network externalities include the computer industry, the telecommunications industry, the consumer electronics industry (videocassette recorders, compact disc players, etc.) and the automobile industry (repair and gas stations). The value of consuming a particular good from the aforementioned industries increases in the number of consumers (the installed base) who have already purchased the good. Networks exhibit positive consumption and production externalities. A positive consumption externality (or network externality) signifies the fact that the utility of consuming a good (e.g. a car engine driven by hydrogen) increases with the (expected) number of other consumers of the good (other car owners). Depending on the network, the externality may be direct or indirect. The source of a positive consumption externality could be a direct physical effect (e.g. the telephone or fax network) or may be generated through indirect effects (e.g. the number of personal computers and the amount and variety of the complementary-good software). 1 For a durable good like an automobile, for example, consumption externalities arise when the availability of post-purchase service for the good depends on the size of the service network. The number of units of the good that are sold will depend on the service network, which in turn will increase if more goods have been sold (e.g. foreign car producers entering the car market). Network externalities arise out of the complementarity of different network pieces. In our paper, car owners value being part of a large network, i.e. using a technology that many other car owners also use (the direct network effect). Car owners also value a technology that is available at a wide variety of gasoline stations, and more gasoline stations are likely to associate with a specific technology if more owners use it (the indirect network effect).
Our example throughout the paper will be the market for natural gaspowered cars or hydrogen-powered cars. Sales will be initially retarded or blocked by consumers' awareness of the thin network of service stations offering natural gas. The scope of the relevant network that gives rise to the consumption externality is identical to the number of already existing petrol stations. The feature of this market is that cars with different engines may use the same network. However, the owner of a natural gas-powered car will find a very thin service system since only a few petrol stations are equipped with natural gas pumps. This small network will reduce his initial willingness to pay for such a motor vehicle.
The interest in a new kind of fuel (natural gas, hydrogen) for cars or in a new technology (fuel cells) arises from the concern about global warming and the scarcity of fossil fuel. CO 2 emissions could be (in a number of cases even drastically) reduced by gas-driven cars (natural gas, methane, compressed natural gas), by hydrogen-powered cars or by a fuel-cell engine system. Fuel cells are the technology for the distant future. They convert natural gas, methanol or hydrogen fuel into electricity without combustion. When the fuel is hydrogen, then water vapour is the only by-product from the fuel cell itself. 2 It will take about eight years before fuel-cell-powered cars are available commercially, and maybe another eight years before they become affordable due to mass production. The true time period will depend, however, on the consumption externality in terms of the network of service and filling stations. 3 To overcome the network problem, most car manufacturers produce bi-fuel-powered cars. The disadvantage of these cars is attributed to the reduction of space for the backseats and for the luggage compartment, which is needed for the two fuel tanks.
Hydrogen-powered cars are even more environmentally friendly than gaspowered cars, but driving with hydrogen is more expensive than with gasoline, given the current price of gasoline. Research institutes, governments and the European Union have started an initiative to develop hydrogenpowered cars that are supposed to replace the gasoline-powered cars by 2025. The background of this initiative is the assumption that the price of oil will increase due to higher costs of exploration of the short-running exhaustible resource. In addition to the expected price increase of oil, a further reason for a switch to hydrogen is global warming. 4 As in the case of the gas-powered engine, the technique is not the problem, the problem is the network. 5 The objective of the paper is to investigate a market for cars with conventional engines versus cars powered by natural gas or hydrogen. These technologies are subject to indirect network externalities generated by the availability of filling stations that carry the appropriate type of fuel. Two competing firms simultaneously and independently from each other choose their technology, which is represented by their locations in a horizontal product differentiation dimension on the unit interval. This location also corresponds to how environmentally friendly a product is. We will analyse a modified two-stage Hotelling duopoly in which products also have a 'vertical' dimension. Consumers differ in their preferences for the product attributes but they all share the same preference concerning the environmental aspect of the product. The product characteristics and the environmental quality are measured on the same unit interval; i.e. a certain product characteristic is associated with a unique environmental quality. Environmentally friendly products are more costly to produce and the cost increases in direct proportion to the product's location on the unit interval. We are interested in the case where the innovative firm offers an entirely environmentally friendly product located at the upper endpoint of the interval and consider the parameter restrictions that yield such an outcome. The main objective of the paper is to show how product characteristics, prices, market shares, profits (in a Nash-equilibrium) change with an increase in the parameters of consumers' environmental awareness and in production costs; that is, to check under which green preferences and production costs one automobile CO 2 emissions by 25 per cent and the summer smog causing reactive carbon-hydrate are down up to 80 per cent. The mileage of 25 kg methane is 360 km and the costs for that distance h15 (61 cents per kg, tax reduced till 2009). For a gasoline-driven car the cost for this distance is about twice as high. However, the price of a gas-powered car is about h2,000 higher than for its gasoline-powered version. 4. Hydrogen is produced from renewable or non-exhaustible resources like biomass, wind or solar energy. Whereas a gasoline-powered car emits 160 g CO 2 per km, a hydrogen-driven car would emit only 35 g CO 2 per km if hydrogen is produced from a non-exhaustible resource. 5. Hydrogen is filled as a liquid at a temperature of À 2531C in a special tank.
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RELATED LITERATURE
In order to relate our findings to the existing literature, we should point out that there are two types of product differentiation: horizontal product differentiation within the same quality group and vertical product differentiation in terms of different quality levels. Horizontal product differentiation emphasizes the fact that the supply of a product variant (within this quality group) does not completely satisfy some or many consumers. It could therefore be a profit-maximizing strategy to offer modifications of a standard product that is closer to the preferences of some customers. Under vertical product differentiation, firms choose a high-or low-quality class in the product space. 6 There is a price-quality competition with a tradeoff in higher prices for better quality or a lower price for the lower quality. In either of these product differentiation models, the firms will choose distinct characteristics or qualities because, as those become close, price competition between the increasingly similar products reduces the firms' profit. In vertical product differentiation models with environmental background, the focus of environmental policy is often on minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen, 1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Motta and Thisse, 1999). 7,8 There is a substantial amount of literature on network externalities; see, for example, Saloner (1985, 1986) , Katz and Shapiro (1985 , 1992 , 1994 , Matutes and Régibeau (1996) , and especially the book by Shy (2001) devoted to this topic. These authors, however, do not use the models of horizontal or vertical product differentiation. Katz and Shapiro (1985) consider a model of static oligopolistic competition with network externalities. Consumers form exogenous expectations on the network size of the 6. See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) or Shaked and Sutton (1982) for typical models of vertical product differentiation. 7. Crampes and Hollander (1995) have shown that when setting a minimum quality standard, the firm producing the lower quality will gain and the high-quality firm will lose profits. Ronnen's (1991) result is that implementing a quality standard narrows the quality gap between firms and brings about a more intensive competition in prices. 8. Environmentally orientated papers dealing with aspects of vertical or horizontal product differentiation are Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) , Cremer and Thisse (1999) , Grilo et al. (2001) , Moraga-González and Padró n-Fumero (2002), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) , Greaker (2003) or Lombardini-Riipinen (2003) .
competing firms on the market (as they will do in our model). Then firms determine their prices on which consumers base their purchase decision. The structure of the equilibria confirms the importance of consumers' expectations in markets where network externalities are present. Given the possibility of multiple equilibria in their model (as well as in our model) when products are incompatible, firms' reputations may play a major role in determining which equilibrium actually occurs. Farrell and Saloner (1986) analyse the incentives for adopting a new technology that is incompatible with the installed base. In an equilibrium the outcome depends on the size of the installed base when the new technology is introduced, it depends on how quickly the network benefits of the new technology are realized and on the relative superiority of the new technology. 9 Our results conform to their results although we use a different model. Another strand of the literature on network economics uses an approach sometimes referred to as the supporting services approach. Software packages, for example, are regarded as supporting services for the hardware. The literature using the supporting services approach includes Shy (1990, 1993) and Church and Gandal (1992a , 1992b , 1996 . As in the case of our car engine, in many instances supporting services are incompatible across brands. Since a hydrogen-powered car must be gas station compatible, we cannot use these models for our case because they compare equilibrium profits and welfare under compatibility and incompatibility.
ASSUMPTIONS

Concise statements
Our non-cooperative game considers two stages. In the first stage, the firms simultaneously choose their respective characteristics. In the second stage, firms compete in prices taking into account the degree of product differentiation. Firm 1 decides to produce the conventional product whereas firm 2 aims at producing an innovative product, i.e. it is a 'sponsor' 10 of technology 2, and introduces this new product to the market. We assume firm 1 can offer improved versions of its technology, whereas firm 2 needs support from environmental consciousness of consumers for the adoption of its technology. Therefore, firm 2 will concentrate on producing the characteristic at the upper end of the 0-1 characteristic line. Firm 1 adheres to the conventional technology but will use its option to vary its characteristics. Both firms include installed base considerations. 9. A model on the automobile market based on the approach by Farrell and Saloner (1986) has been outlined by Sartzetakis and Tsigaris (2000) . 10. Katz and Shapiro (1986) call a firm a sponsor of a technology if it controls the property rights to a given technology. In that case, the firm will be willing to invest into the network or in the form of penetration pricing to establish the technology because then there is the prospect of profits in later periods.
Consumers base their purchase decision on prices, product differentiation (a characteristic q that affects the willingness to pay of a potential customer) and on the network effect. There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed over Hotelling's [0, 1] interval. Each consumer buys one unit of the product. The net-utility of consumer y[½0; 1 for a unit of the good of quality q 1 is defined by
in which r stands for the gross, intrinsic utility a consumer derives from consuming one unit of the product. 11 The term tðq 1 À yÞ 2 represents the costs a consumer, located at y[ 0; 1 ½ , bears if he does not get his preferred characteristic as he buys from firm 1 selling characteristic q 1 . The parameter t expresses the strength of personal preferences. It can be normalized to 1 in the gross utility term (the term without the price) without loss of generality. With d(1 À q 1 ) we express the awareness of a negative externality caused by the product, i.e. environmental concern. It is modelled as a burden of guilt of not having purchased the most energy-efficient and hence environmentally friendly product at the end of the quality line [0, 1]. We therefore incorporate environmental concern directly into individual preferences. 12 This 'warm glow' effect means that individuals perceive utility by providing a small amount of a public good. 13 The 'warm glow' effect has been recognized in the literature on the valuation of environmental quality as one of the potentially important factors behind the willingness to pay for environmental quality (see Kriström, 1999) . 14 The price of firm 1 is p 1 and the term gn 1 ðtÞ is the network benefit for good 1 where t is the expected market share of firm 2, i.e. n 1 (0) 5 n at the beginning, n is the total number of customers. Network benefits enter consumers' utility and they are willing to pay for that. The size of the network benefit is modelled as a product of the strength of the network effect g and its size n 1 (t). The network gains importance as g increases. Since n 1 þ n 2 5 n, n 2 (t) are the customers of firm 2 (n 2 (0) 5 0). The network benefit for firm 1 decreases, i.e. it will become less important when the number of consumers n 2 (t), connected to the competing network of good 2, increases. Hence, the utility that a given user derives from the good depends upon the number of other users who are in the same network as he is. All n consumers have bought the product of firm 1 in the past. Its characteristic could have been 11. In the tradition of spatial models of product differentiation, it is assumed that r is sufficiently large to ensure that all consumers prefer buying rather than dropping out of the market. 12. See Conrad (2005) for a model with care for the environment. 13. In equation (1) y is no longer 'the bliss point' of the consumer, as in conventional horizontal product differentiation models. The FOC of equation (1) with respect to q 1 yields y þ ðd=2 tÞ as the bliss point. 14. See Section 3.2 for some additional remarks on this term. q 1 5 0 whereas firm 2 considers producing only the new, energy-efficient product, i.e. q 2 5 1. This maximal horizontal product differentiation at the 0-1 endpoints of the Hotelling line is the outcome of the standard Hotelling model without environmental concern and network effects. Later on we will derive the parameter constellations under which maximal horizontal differentiation is a Nash equilibrium and under which one q 1 > 0; q 2 ¼ 1 is an equilibrium of the two-stage game in price and quality competition. The net-utility of a customer when buying a unit from firm 2 is vðq 2 ; yÞ ¼ r À tðq 2 À yÞ 2 À dð1 À q 2 Þ À p 2 þ gn 2 ðtÞ ð 2Þ
Even if the attribute is highly esteemed (e.g. q 2 5 1) and the good not expensive, the innovative firm might be unsuccessful because the installed base does not exist. After the outcome of the game, all n customers will be served. As n 2 (0) is zero or very small at the beginning, the network benefit term represents the aspect that, when introducing a new technology, the first question that comes to mind is whether the new technology will be adopted given the large installed base (i.e. n À n 2 ) of the existing technology.
For products with network effects, expectations play a central role because the vigour of the network depends on the expected future market share and on the market share in the past. In order to determine the expected market share we assume that consumers have rational expectations; that is, they expect the market share that will result at the end of the competitive process. 15 Such a fulfilled expectation equilibrium results in: n 1 ð1 ÀŷÞ ¼ nŷ; n 2 ð1 ÀŷÞ ¼ n½1 Àŷ ð 3Þ
wheret ¼ ð1 ÀŷÞ is the expected market share of firm 2 (consumers to the right ofŷ ) andŷ is the expected market share of firm 1 (consumers to the left ofŷ ) and byŷ we denote the critical consumer who is indifferent between consuming q 1 or q 2 .
Motivation of assumptions using the automobile market
In our model firm 1 produces the gasoline-powered engine whereas firm 2, the sponsor, shows interest in the production of a hydrogen-powered engine because environmental concern and the prospect of running out of oil in the near future offers a good chance of profits. 16 Depending on environmental 15. When network externalities exist, consumers must form expectations regarding the size of (competing) networks. Katz and Shapiro (1985) use a notion of fulfilled expectation equilibrium. For some set of expectations only one firm will produce output, while for other sets of expectations there will be both firms in the market. At a market equilibrium of the simple single-period world, expectations are fulfilled (n 5 n e ). 16. In Proposition 1 in Section 4.1, we will give parameter conditions for an environmental (energy efficiency) and production cost tradeoff such that offering hydrogen-driven cars is a rational strategy.
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r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 concern and cost aspects, firm 1 will use its option to improve gasoline efficiency within the [0, 1] interval. The network of gasoline stations is exogenous to the firms and they know about consumers' awareness of the compatibility of an engine with a filling station. In the automobile market, compatibility of the new product of firm 2 with the installed base of firm 1 is not a meaningful strategy as it is for a personal computer producer offering an IBM-compatible personal computer that can use the standard software. 17 A natural gas-powered car is not compatible with the existing network of gasoline stations. 18 Consumers' awareness in our model is equivalent to the negative externality caused by traffic such as air pollution from CO 2 and NO x emissions. As a characteristic q of the good, which affects the willingness to pay of a potential customer, we consider different types of engines within a quality class of motor vehicles. The characteristic of the consumer, described by y[½0; 1, is the interest in energy-related attributes of a car, which is the reason for their different willingness to pay. Some customers consider gasguzzlers as comfortable cars although they are extremely environmentally unfriendly, while others care about an environmentally friendly technology like fuel cells, although they have asymmetric information with respect to the property and reliability of this technology. Products localized to the left are characterized by aspects linked to fuel inefficiency, like horsepower and driving dynamics, and products to the right by stillness in running, a low noise gauge of the engine and by a jerk-free start and a more comfortable stop-and-go driving. In such a model of horizontal product differentiation, we do not assume that if q 2 4q 1 and prices are equal all consumers purchase the environmentally friendlier car with q 2 . Some consumers prefer automatic transmission (which needs more fuel), a better initial velocity, they enjoy the noise of the engine and its driving dynamics. That is, we assume that the difference in the willingness to pay uðq 1 ; yÞ À uðq 2 ; yÞ, if product characteristics q 1 and q 2 differ, is positive for some consumers and negative for others.
By the term d(1 À q i ) we have incorporated the aspect that individual environmental awareness gives some utility on its own even if it does not lead to a better environmental quality. When q 1 5 0, then d represents the highest money-metric disutility from emissions (environmental damage) including excessive fuel consumption. When q 1 5 1, there is no disutility because the 17. See Pfähler and Wiese (1998) for a game in the degrees of compatibility. For a survey on compatibility and network effects see Wiese (1997) . 18. We exclude the strategy to produce cars with bi-fuel engines, having two tanks. This strategy, observable in reality, is a way to become compatible with the installed base.
Although it would eliminate the advantage of the installed base of the competitor, it raises the cost of production and in addition reduces the capacity of the trunk compartment. Instead of adding another stage to the game where firms simultaneously decide upon the compatibility of their products, then on quality and finally on prices, we could interpret a car close to the right end of the product line to be equivalent to a bi-fuel car. For the consumer, partial compatibility is offset by the reduced space of the trunk compartment.
consumer has decided in favour of the most environmentally friendly and efficient technology. 19 As an example, at the beginning of the market game all households own a gasoline-powered car. Firm 2 considers to produce cars with q 2 5 1, whereas firm 1 responds by improving fuel efficiency of its engine by raising q 1 from q 1 5 0 (10 l/100 km) to q 1 5 0.5 (6 l/100 km) or finally towards q 1 5 1 (3 l/100 km). In the case of q 1 5 1, households would be indifferent in terms of the property of fuel efficiency of cars. However, as offering homogeneous product is not a profit-maximizing strategy under horizontal product differentiation, we exclude this case in the subsequent analysis. The difference of the netutilities in equations (1) and (2) shows the possibilities firms have for attracting customers: vðq 1 ; yÞ À vðq 2 ; yÞ ¼ p 2 À p 1 À t |fflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl} Price effect ðq 1 À yÞ 2 À ðq 2 À yÞ 2 h i |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} Horizontal product differentiation À dðq 2 À q 1 Þ |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl} Image concern þ g n 1 ðtÞ À n 2 ðtÞ ð Þ |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl ffl} Network effect
Firm 1 can increase or keep its market share by a price advantage, by product differentiation, by taking into account environmental concern of consumers and by the difference of the size of the network. Whereas firms can determine price and quality, they cannot influence the network advantage that comes from the installed base in the past and from expectations on demand and on compatibility.
RESULTS
Equilibrium prices, market shares and characteristics
We are interested in finding a consumerŷ[ð0; 1Þ who is indifferent at prices p 1 , p 2 to purchase from producer 1 (to the left ofŷ ) or from producer 2 (to the right ofŷ ). From vðq 1 ;ŷÞ ¼ vðq 2 ;ŷÞ and the condition that the networks, expected by the consumer, are the actual networks, i.e. equation (3), we can solve forŷ to get firm 1's specific demand function D 1 ð p 1 ; p 2 Þ ¼ŷ:
19. The term d(1 À q 1 ) could also be interpreted in the following sense. If a car to the left has more horsepower, then everybody will prefer it, so the quality part could be written as t 1 À q 1 ð Þ , and the environmental part as À dð1 À q 1 Þ (the 'warm glow' effect). We do not separate the two but assume that in ð t À dÞð1 À q 1 Þ with d :¼ t À d the environmental concern dominates the horsepower quality aspect (which in principle is vertically differentiated). That is, we focus on horizontal product differentiation by assuming that the environmental parameter is relatively more important to the average driver than the horsepower quality aspect. The fuel bill is taken into account by defining r as a net intrinsic utility adjusted for fuel costs. The difference in fuel consumption is captured by dð1 À q 1 Þ. 
where t has been set equal to 1. In this comparative static analysis, we assume that an equilibrium emerges after a certain period of time. We do not describe the market process which might lead to the following three types of equilibrium market structure: (a)ŷ ¼ 1; 1 Àŷ ¼ 0 (market exit of firm 2); (b) y ¼ 0; 1 Àŷ ¼ 1 (market exit of firm 1) and (c) 0 <ŷ < 1; 1 > 1 Àŷ > 0 (both firms share the market). Our objective is to characterize the quality choices and pricing policies that would be consistent with these three types of market structure.
The demand function for firm 2 is
We observe that the price response of market demand is higher if there is a network effect. A marginal decrease of firm 2's price raises its demand by 1/2(q 2 À q 1 ) if g 5 0, but by the higher factor 1/[2(q 2 À q 1 ) À 2gn] under network effects. Demand is raised by the non-network factor 1/2(q 2 À q 1 ), which raises expectations of a higher market share. This in turn raises demand beyond this factor. 20 In producing the two characteristics we assume that there is a marginal cost c to increasing quality q i . The costs of production are higher for a producer of family-sized middle-class cars if he offers an engine with about the same horsepower but with a better fuel efficiency. By backward induction, firms maximize profit with respect to price:
and p 2 ¼ p 2 n 2 À cq 2 n 2 ¼ nð p 2 À cq 2 Þð1 Àŷð p 1 ; p 2 ÞÞ ð8Þ
Lemma 1. The Nash equilibrium in prices p * 1 ; p * 2 , derived from the FOCs of maximizing equations (7) and (8), is 20. In order to check for a unique equilibrium consumer partition that is associated with any given price pair we can follow Grilo et al. (2001) . They determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for y defined by equation (5) to belong to (0, 1). Then they characterize the price pairs ensuring that a single firm serves the whole consumer population. By exchanging b n 2 i in their terms by d(1 À q i ) we end up with the same conclusion of a unique equilibrium.
Under price competition, the network effect lowers the equilibrium prices of both firms. The equilibrium market shares follow from equations (5) and (6) by inserting p * 1 ; p * 2 from equations (9) and (10): 21
Before we interpret prices and market shares for our three cases (a)-(c), we analyse the quality game at the first stage of our two-stage game. As mentioned at the beginning, we are interested in a situation in which firm 2 commits to q 2 5 1, i.e. it produces natural gas-driven cars, or it does not produce at all. Only firm 1 will use the option to vary q 1 in terms of fuel efficiency. In order to get a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the quality choices q 1 and q 2 , firm 1 determines max q 1 p 1 ðq 1 ; q 2 Þ ¼ ½ p * 1 ðq 1 ; q 2 Þ À cq 1 ny * ðq 1 ; q 2 Þ A solution q * 1 follows from @p 1 =@q 1 ¼ 0. The FOC is 3q * 2 1 þ q * 1 À4q 2 þ 2 À ðd À cÞ þ 4gn ð Þ þ q 2 2 À q 2 2 À ðd À cÞ ð Þþ2gn 1 À ðd À cÞ ð ÞÀgn ¼ 0
Hence, we have to solve a quadratic equation in q * 1 . Similarly, the problem of firm 2 is
21. The second-order condition of the profit-maximization problem in equation (7) postulates that the denominator in equation (11) must be positive.
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An immediate implication of equation (15) is that the locational game never has an equilibrium where both firms choose interior values in (0, 1) as d À c cannot be ! 1/2 and À 1/2. For an equilibrium with q * 2 ¼ 1, we require d À c ! À 1/2. Proposition 1. The net effect of environmental concern and cost of quality, i.e. d À c, must be at least À 1/2 for an equilibrium with q * 2 ¼ 1.
Proposition 1 implies that in case the government wishes that there is a sponsor who is willing to offer the new technology, it has to raise environmental concern d in the population or it has to subsidize the cost of production, c.
Because we set q * 2 equal to one, q * 1 in equation (15) is no more the best response to q * 2 ¼ 1. We therefore have to determine the best response of firm 1 to q * 2 ¼ 1, and then have to check whether the best response of firm 2 on that q 1 is still a q * 2 Z1. To calculate the best response q 1 ¼ q R 1 ðq * 2 ¼ 1Þ we solve equation (13) for q 1 Z0. For example, if gn 5 0, then q 1 ¼ q R 1 ð1Þ ¼ ðd À cÞ À 1 ð Þ =3. If d À c 1, then q 1 5 0 as q 1 must not be negative; if ðd À cÞ[ð1; 4Þ then q 1 [ð0; 1. Next we have to check whether q * 2 ¼ 1 is still the best response of firm 2 on q 1 ¼ q R 1 ð1Þ, i.e. we have to check for q 2 q R 1 ð1Þ À Á Z1 by solving equation (14) for q 2 . With gn 5 0 the solution is
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium for the case gn 5 0 and d À c [ À1=2; 1 ½ is q * 1 ¼ 0; q * 2 ¼ 1, and for d À c [ð1; 4 it is q * 1 ¼ ðd À cÞ À 1 ð Þ =3 > 0; q * 2 ¼ 1. In an analogous way we can determine Nash equilibria q * 1 Z0; q * 2 ¼ 1 for d À c [½À1=2; 4 and gn ! 0. As mentioned before, we do not analyse the dynamics of market entry when network effects may deter it. We only do comparative statics by comparing an equilibrium at the beginning (only firm 1 exists) with an equilibrium where either firm 1 or firm 2 exists, or where both firms compete in the market. We consider two cases of d À c: one in which the difference is less than 1 and one in which it is greater than 1. 22 . Several other pairs of solutions did not satisfy either the restriction g40, or the denominator in y * became zero for the q 1 , q 2 pair. Such a solution was
Characteristics and market shares under weak environmental concern
We label the case ðd À cÞ[½À1=2; 1 as weak environmental concern and it implies that we have obtained a corner solution for q i q * 1 ¼ 0; q * 2 ¼ 1 À Á . The formula for the market share y * is then as presented in Table 1 .
If environmental concern is very weak (d À c 5 À 1/2), the market share y * of firm 1 will be above 1/2 irrespective of the network effect (column 2 in Table 1 ). It can even be 1 if in addition the network effect is strong (gn 5 5/6) (not presented in Table 1 ). 23 Then firm 1 will remain a monopoly producing energy-inefficient ðq * 1 ¼ 0Þ products at low costs ðq * 1 c ¼ 0Þ, i.e. without investment costs for improved energy efficiency. If the supporting network effect is weak, the market share declines towards 7/12 ( 5 0.583) and firm 2 can reach up to 5/12 market share. Its products are costly ðq * 2 c ¼ cÞ, but environmentally concerned consumers find them attractive and the network is not an obstacle to buy them.
Proposition 2. A higher network effect favours that firm which had achieved a market share above 1/2 even without such an effect. Network effects will strengthen the dominance of the successful firm. The more the d effect dominates the c effect, the smaller becomes the market share of firm 1. Table 1 Weak environmental concern: ðd À cÞ[ À 1 2 ; 1
Values of y* gn 5 0 0.583 1/2 1/3 gn 5 0.05 0.588 @y Ã @ðd À cÞ < 0 1/2 @y Ã @ðd À cÞ < 0 0.325 gn 5 0.1 0.592 @y Ã @gn > 0 1/2 @y Ã @ gn < 0 0.314 gn 5 0.2 0.604 1/2 0.292 gn 5 0.3 0.619 1/2 0.262
23. The SOC of equation (7), i.e. 2ðq * 2 À q * 1 Þ À 2gn > 0, restricted the value of gn. If q * 1 ¼ 0 then gno1.
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If the d effect dominates the c effect (i.e. d À c40), then firm 1 will account for less than 1/2 market share, irrespective of the network effect (column 6 in Table 1 ). The dominating d effect operates in favour of firm 2. It is supported by the network effect because market shares beyond 1/2 raise the benefit of a network. If the network effect is high (gn 5 2/3; not presented in Table 1) , firm 1 will be driven out of the market because competition forced it to charge a price p * 1 ¼ 0 (for firm 2 it is p * 2 ¼ c þ 2=3). As the partial derivatives indicate, the market share y * decreases in d À c (column 5 in Table 1 ).
In Table 1 we also present the price and profit situation under the different environmental concerns and network impacts. As we know from equations (9) and (10), a well-developed network enforces price competition. Prices are the highest if no network is required (g 5 0). For each d À c, profits of both firms decrease if the network effect becomes stronger ð@p i =@ gn ð Þ< 0Þ.
Proposition 3. As far as profits are concerned, the worst case for firm 1 is a strong network effect (gn 5 2/3) and environmental concern, dominating the cost aspect (d À c 5 1). 24 The worst case for firm 2 is also a strong network effect in addition to a cost aspect that dominates environmental concern (d À c 5 À 1/2). 25
The intuition for the first statement is that firm 1 has problems to attract customers for its less environmentally friendly product and hence does not have a high market share to get support from a strong network effect. The reason for the second statement is that the high-cost firm 2 with the environmentally friendly product has problems to get support from the network effect if customers do not care much about the environment (its market share is zero). If environmental concern increases, firm 1 lowers its price to prevent a decline in its market share ð@p * 1 =@ðd À cÞ < 0Þ, but firm 2 can increase its price because its product becomes more attractive ð@p * 2 =@ðd À cÞ > 0Þ.
Firm 2's first-best case is if no network effect is required (g 5 0) and concern for the environment is high (d À c 5 1). In that case, price competition is weak and environmentally concerned consumers (1 À y * 5 2/3 or 66 per cent) are ready to pay a high price for those products ð p * 2 ¼ 4=3 þ cÞ. Firm 1 also prefers g 5 0, but when the cost effect dominates environmental concern (d À c 5 À 1/2). It then makes a high profit by selling at a relatively high price ð p * 1 ¼ 6=5Þ to 58 per cent of the consumers. In each of these two cases both firms operate in the market. 24 . It is p * 1 ¼ 0; y * ¼ 0 according to the formulas for p * 1 and y * in Table 1 . 25. For gn 5 5/6, it is p * 2 ¼ c and 1 À y * 5 0.
Characteristics and market shares under strong environmental concern
Table 2 presents the change in the market structure and in environmental quality when environmental concern becomes stronger. As in this case, firm 1's market share drops below 1/2, it raises its environmental quality q * 1 and it could even approach q * 2 ¼ 1 when d À c 5 4. Although profits then approach zero for both firms, strong environmental concern has compelled firm 1, however, to produce its environmentally most friendly version of an engine. If environmental concern increases from d À c 5 1 to d À c 5 1.5, firm 1 raises its quality q * 1 from 0 to q * 1 ¼ 1=6 but will not gain a market share y * beyond 1/2 (column 2 in Table 2 ). As the market share does not exceed 0.277, a strong network effect finally leads to market exit of firm 1. It reacts to its declining market share by lowering q * 1 to save costs and to achieve higher Table 2 Strong environmental concern: d À c [½1:5; 4
We do not consider the boundary case d À c ¼ 4 and q Ã 1 ¼ 1. Besides the fact that numerator and denominator in y Ã become zero, the homogeneous product case is not a profit-maximizing choice under horizontal product differentiation. b The SOC of equation (7) is 2ðq Ã 2 À q Ã 1 Þ À 2gn > 0 and implies values of gn no larger than q Ã 2 À q Ã 1 . c The limits y Ã ! 0 and q 1 ! 1 as d À c ! 4 follow immediately from equation (11) in combination with q 1 ¼ ððd À cÞ À 1Þ=3; q Ã 2 ¼ 1 and gn ¼ 0.
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r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 prices by moving away from q * 2 ¼ 1. However, the more intensive price competition under a higher g will finally lead to market exit. 26 Proposition 4. When environmental concern increases (d À c ! 1.5), firm 1 raises its quality q * 1 but nevertheless loses market shares. A strong network effect works again in favour of the dominant firm; this time it is firm 2 that has a market share above 1/2. If gn increases, the market share of firm 1 will soon approach zero.
Finally, the case presented in the sixth column of Table 2 implies that both firms choose q * 1 ¼ q * 2 ¼ 1. This would imply that they share the market and charge a price p * 1 ¼ p * 2 ¼ c À gn below unit cost. This market structure does not occur because both firms would make a loss. 27 As in Table 1 , the profit situation for both firms improves if the network effect becomes less important because in that case price competition is weak and prices are high. Firm 1 responds to an increasing environmental concern by increasing its quality and hence has to raise its price. On the other side, the products become less heterogeneous and price competition will result in lower prices. If the cost effect of producing a higher q 1 dominates the competition effect, then firm 1 might increase its price (see the last row in Table 2 ). As under weak environmental concern firm 1 sticks to q * 1 ¼ 0, more environmental concern permits firm 2 to raise its price (see the last row in Table 1 ). The opposite is the case when firm 1 responds by increasing its quality q * 1 because then the products become more homogeneous.
APPLICATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Socially optimal position of environmentally friendly engines
We finally check whether the private choice of the characteristics q * 1 and q * 2 coincides with the socially optimal ones, preferred by an environmental authority. For that purpose we define social welfare as a function of q 1 and q 2 . It is equal to the aggregate willingness to pay minus the cost of production. However, the authority is not satisfied with drivers' environmental concern, d, but considers in addition environmental damage from automobile use. We therefore denote with d the damage parameter that consists of the environmental damage from air pollution as well as of the loss in consumers' utility from insufficient environmental awareness, i.e. d is part of d and d À d 26. It is y * ¼ 0 and p * 1 ¼ 0 for gn 5 0.5, according to the formulas for y * and p * 1 in Table 2 . 27. The SOC of equations (6) and (7), i.e. 2ðq * 2 À q * 1 Þ À 2gn > 0, cannot be satisfied because of the restriction g ! 0.
is environmental damage. Therefore 28
For maximizing welfare in equation (16) with respect to q 1 and q 2 , we first integrate W with respect to y, and then we set the partial derivatives of W(q 1 , q 2 ) equal to zero. Solving the two FOCs for q 1 and q 2 yields the characteristics that maximize social welfare: 29
The optimal characteristics consist of two terms. The first term suggests a shift towards the environmentally more friendly engine if social environmental concern is adjusted by private environmental concern and positive (i.e. d À d > 0). In that case there is real environmental damage. The second term takes into account costs and private environmental awareness and adjusts the position of the social optimal characteristics 1/4 and 3/4, obtained in the standard model ð d ¼ d ¼ c ¼ 0Þ. 30 Our next step is to compare the Nash equilibrium in characteristics, q * i , with the socially optimal ones,q i in equation (17). We will assume that firm 2 and the environmental authority are interested in the option q * 2 ¼ 1. For firm 2 this implied d À c ! À 1/2, and for the authority it implies d À dZ1 in equation (17) for the case of weak environmental concern, i.e. for d À c [½À1=2; 1=2. Then q * 2 ¼q 2 ¼ 1. In order to demonstrate how the environmental authority can regulate firm 1 to build environmentally more friendly engines, we choose cases of parameter constellations that permit one to solve the optimal response q R 1 ðq 2 ¼ 1Þ in equation (13) explicitly. First, we concentrate on the interval (d À c)A[ À 1/2, 1/2] where the private choice is q * 1 ¼ 0. Second, we set d À d ¼ 1 which impliesq 2 Z1 for (d À c)A[ À 1/2, 1/2] andq 1 > q * 1 ¼ 0; i.e. energy efficiency is below the social standardq 1 . Lastly, we choose gnA[0, 0.3], which implies non-negative market shares for the parameter constellations under consideration. As q * 1 ¼ 0; q * 2 ¼ 1 for this case, 28. The market share y separates the consumers with higher welfare from q 1 from those with higher welfare from q 2 ; i.e. r À ðq 1 À yÞ 2 À dð1 À q 1 Þ þ gn y À cq 1 ¼ r À ðq 2 À yÞ 2 À dð1 À q 2 Þ þ gn y À cq 2 . This condition yields y ¼ 1 2 ðq 1 þ q 2 À d þ cÞ. 29. The proof will be sent on request to the interested reader by mail or e-mail. 30. Insertingq i in equation (17) into y, explained in footnote 28, yields y ¼ 1=2 for the location of the indifferent consumer.
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The socially optimal energy efficiency should bê
Choosing environmental policy instruments for improving energy efficiency
In order to achieve that q * 1 is equal toq 1 , we have to introduce a policy parameter as an incentive for firm 1 to produceq 1 . One possibility is to set c ¼ c À s where s would be a subsidy (s40) on the marginal cost of quality because q * 1 is too low. We are therefore interested in finding a value of s such that
with q R 1 ðc À sÞ from equation (13). If we insert q R 1 ðc À sÞ ¼q 1 into the market share equation (11), we obtain y S ¼ ð1 Àq 1 Þ 3 þq 1 À ðd À cÞ À s ½ À 3gn 6 1 Àq 1 À gn ½
We consider two parameter variations, presented in Table 3 . In one variation, we set gn 5 0 and increase d À c from À 1/2 to 1/4 (see first row of Table 3 ). In a second one, we set d À c 5 À 1/2 and increase gn from 0 to 1/12 (see first column in Table 3 ). In these cases all variables, shown in Table 3 , can easily be calculated. 31 Let us first consider the case of no network effect (first row in Table 3 ). An increasing subsidy is required if environmental concern tends to dominate the cost effect because the social optimal quality should be at least 1/2. In spite of the subsidy, the market share of firm 1 declines drastically. The reason for this is that firm 2, already producing the environmentally friendly engine, also gets the subsidy because c ¼ c À s is the marginal cost of quality for both firms. Next, we fix d À c 5 À 1/2 and increase the network effect. As we have seen in the previous section, prices decrease if the network effect matters, because the firms compete for market shares above 50 per cent. Producing a quality ofq 1 ¼ 1=2 instead of q * 1 ¼ 0 raises costs and prices. Hence, higher 31. We have excluded cases like d À c [½1=2; 1 which would imply q R 1 ðc À sÞ ¼q 1 ¼ 1, i.e. the products are homogeneous (a 3 l/100 km car and a hydrogen-powered engine) and prices drop below marginal cost ð p * i ¼ c À gnÞ. Such an outcome is not of interest for the regulator. 
Partial derivatives at gn
@s @gn > 0 @y @ðd À cÞ < 0;
@y @gn
The first row in a rectangle shows quality and market share of firm 1 without regulation, the second row gives the size of the subsidy and the third row shows the social optimum achieved by the subsidy.
subsidies are required to induce firm 1 to chooseq 1 ¼ 1=2. Nevertheless, it loses market shares as firm 2 benefits from the subsidy too.
To reduce transportation emissions and energy consumption, policymakers typically use one of two approaches -changing technology or changing behaviour. An alternative policy to raise q * 1 could be a campaign to enhance environmental awareness, d, of the consumers by d (advertising, television spots, education about environmental impacts). The equivalent condition to equation (19) is
The size of the required impact on environmental awareness, d, is equal to s in Table 3 ; hence, the values of the variables are the same. Now firm 2 does not benefit from a subsidy because it has produced the clean technology anyway, but because of higher environmental awareness of all motorists. We conclude that it is possible for the regulator to give incentives such that the private choice of the type of engine coincides with the regulator's goal.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We considered a duopoly producing horizontally differentiated products that are non-compatible with respect to a network that provides a complementary good. The existence of network effects plays a crucial role because it can (i) impede the creation of a market, (ii) impede market entrance and (iii) provide market power to the incumbent firm. As an example, we referred to two automobile producers: one offering cars with an engine powered by gasoline and the other offering cars with an engine powered by natural gas. The network is petrol stations that, at present only in a few cases, provide two kinds of fuel. We specified a network effect that is strengthened by the market share of a firm. The equilibrium of the two-stage game could be either one with the incumbent firm as the only producer, or one with the innovative firm as the only producer, or one where both firms share the market. Which equilibrium will emerge depends on the cost of production, on the network effect and on environmental awareness of the consumers. The latter aspect has been introduced to give the innovative firm a chance to stay in the market.
In the first stage of our two-stage game, the firms decide on the degree of product differentiation in terms of fuel efficiency. In the standard model of this type, firms choose the extreme position, i.e. the endpoints of the Hotelling 0-1 line. That need not be the case in our model. Now which type of car will be produced, will depend on environmental awareness and the cost of producing energy-efficient engines. We have also shown that the network effect exerts an impact on optimal product differentiation as well as on price competition, the game at the second stage. The higher the strength of the network effect, the lower will be the equilibrium prices and the more will firm 1 downgrade its quality to relax price competition. If a firm has a market share above 1/2, then its share will increase with the strength of the network effect. As a strong network effect enforces competition, profits will be low. The more environmental concern dominates the cost aspect, the lower will be the market share of the firm that produces energy-inefficient engines, and the higher will be the share of the entrant producing the new technology. The effort of the conventional firm to produce an energy-efficient engine, equivalent to the natural gas-powered engine, ends in fierce price competition and struggle for the network support with losses for both firms.
We finally determine a socially optimal allocation of the characteristics on the [0, 1] Hotelling line by maximizing a social welfare function with respect to the two characteristics. The result was that the regulator wishes a more energy-efficient engine (a higher q 1 ) than a private firm develops. By choosing an appropriate subsidy on costs it is, however, possible that firm 1 produces a car with a socially optimal energy efficiency.
The objective of our approach has been to sketch a model that captures product differentiation under environmental aspects, the necessity of support by a network and price competition whereby environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce. A topic for future research could be to model the dynamics in an intertemporal setting with control variables (quality, price) and stock variables (market shares). Another topic could be to extend our two-stage game by a first stage with competition in compatibility to the network. Such an approach could examine the success of firms that produce cars with two tanks -one for gasoline and one for natural gas.
